The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) incursion into Sierra Leone’s capital in the early hours of Wednesday 6th January 1999 must be remembered. However, remembering the invasion only for the death and destruction visited on the city feeds the risk of that failure we keep repeating; the failure to learn from history. Only with a look at the bigger picture and the strategic environment can lessons be learnt which will then give opportunity and hope of minimising the risk of tragic reruns of the nightmare, or descent into versions of the tragedy.

What happened that day twenty years ago pushed the conflict into a decisive phase by awakening many to the reality that there was a very real threat to Sierra Leone. The civil war which was only declared over three years after “J6” had in some circles been more of a conversation topic or convenient excuses, and less of a matter demanding real concern. There was also the not-so-minor factor of a resource-stretched government asking an that an army it didn’t seem to wholeheartedly trust prosecute a war it wasn’t quite fit to fight. The cocktail became lethal when RUF banditry was thrown into the mix because all it needed was not a lot of operational art to have rebels crawling all over the city.

The war had started during the presidency of a retired army General who, cocooned by sycophancy, led a government that paid a very unhelpful and dangerous respect to tribal allegiance. Also true is that the rule of law had for the longest time been an optional extra and subject to the far from objective interpretations of those who held power. The environment didn’t need the brains of sociologist or political scientist to be assessed as especially dangerous in the way it deliberately or unwittingly left many Sierra Leoneans feeling they did not have a stake in their own country. Interestingly, it was all happening under the catchy-termed “Constructive Nationalism” agenda; proof, if needed, of the need for caution when faced with attractive slogans.

What also seemed to aid the war was an absence of strategic detail. Back of fag packet reactions and decisions seemed to drive things. If it sounded good, not a lot of care seemed to go into whether it will work or have a chance of working. The hasty and dramatic increase in the size of the country’s military seemingly happened without due regard to the doctrinally and internationally recognised concept of ‘fighting power’; and the factors that fed into it. So, while (part of) the physical component was addressed by putting loads more boots on the ground, the conceptual component and moral component were not adequately, if at all, addressed. Yes, what to fight with was loosely thought of without enough regard to how to fight and, more importantly, the willingness to fight; and we have that stroll into the capital and then State House by junior officers on 29th April 1992 as proof of that.

A further strategic failure is in seeing matters affecting the country with varying degrees of concern or seriousness that suggest it only matters when in the big cities and especially so when in the capital. The incursion into Freetown is marked with more noise and reflection than the 23rd March 1991 invasion of the country. I for one have never seen or heard of dates for attacks on Kenema and Makeni; and we know they happened. Fact is, government announcements and social media posts testify to the fact that, for most, only the attacks on Freetown mattered and continue to matter.

Finally, for now anyway, that attitude to issues, particularly to matters of bad news, seriously needs shifting. As General Colin Powell said, “bad news isn’t like wine; it doesn’t get better with age”. The reactions to the war’s start and the dissemination of reports from the front probably left many not appreciating the real and present danger that hung over the country. Pretending it isn’t happening doesn’t stop it happening and pretending it isn’t serious often only allows it to get more serious.

All in, as much as we must remember the dreadful events of ‘J6’ and the ensuing weeks, it is important we do so within the appropriate framework, so we learn from it and give ourselves a chance of making it less likely we will have other such days to remember.

© Othame Kabia